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Abstract
This paper offers an outline of a ‘new’ social contract
envisaged by Ferenbach and Pinney (2012), and establishes its
critical appraisal elucidating the inaccuracy of their assertions
including the one, which is erroneously dubbed as a ‘new’ social
contract, purportedly, not based on any ideology. Thus, the discreet
embeddedness of the ‘new’ social contract in ideological and political
perspectives is explicitly exposed. In fact, the suggested ‘new’ social
contract is more or less a continuation or an extension of the pervasive
neoliberal ideology. The proposed social contract may at the most be
viewed as a new variant of neoliberal ideology. It is also observed
that the proposed integration of CSV (creating shared value) with
business in the context of proposed social contract is on the whole a
disguised strategic CSR (corporate social responsibility) which is
not a detachment from the neoliberal ideology.
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Introduction
Ferenbach and Pinney (2012) argue that the existing social
contract between the public and the private sectors has become
obsolete. It is the forces unleashed by globalization that are mainly
responsible for the obsolescence of the above-mentioned social
contract that, according to them, prevailed for the last sixty years.
They hint that it was the incessant rootedness of the economic and
financial practices in the old social contract that was responsible for
the continued inefficiency of the public sector as well as a root cause
of the Great Recession. The evolution of business and the private
sector demands the creation of a new social contract between the
private and public domains. Ferenbach and Pinney (2012) argue that
the structure of the national governments was originally designed for
a different time from the one we are living in. They hold that a new
framework for the public-private collaboration is required for
sustainable growth, uninterrupted by recessions and meltdowns. They
maintain that two critical challenges must be met. First, an overseeing
regulatory framework for the private sector must be established.
Responsibility for the development of this regulatory framework cannot
be wholly and solely left to the governments. The second challenge is
to find ways and means to use the private-sector capabilities to help
governments deliver goods and services more efficiently and
effectively. Governments are strongly recommended to divest
nationalized businesses as well as other services and responsibilities
to the private sector.
To me the proposed social contract is, in essence, neither
new nor disengaged from ideology. The proposed implicit balance
between the private and the public sectors is skewed toward the private
sector especially in terms of authority. This appraisal is mainly
grounded on the social democratic perspective.
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An Outline of the Proposed ‘New’ Social Contract
Ferenbach and Pinney (2012) hold that the private-public
social contract, that prevailed for the last 60 years, started becoming
obsolete since 1980s specifically with the increasing global integration
of markets, and eventually “the Great Recession has exposed the
erosion” of this social contract (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 11). The
new business milieu requires the grounding of organizational strategy
in the ability to learn quickly, adapt rapidly and respond instantly.
“The consequence of this new strategic operating environment has
been a widening gap between the capabilities of nation states and
those of private and public companies” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012:
9). In other words, the obsolescence of the ‘old’, that is, the existing
social contract has been caused by the increasing complexification of
the markets and businesses. This obsolescence of the existing social
compact has, in turn, created a pressing demand for the formation of
a new social contract. Ferenbach and Pinney propose the sketch of a
new social contract in the form of a discussion of the key issues
involved.
Ferenbach and Pinney claim that their sketch of ‘new’ social
contract is not structured on any ideological or political grounds.
They pronounce it a premise, that is, the functional success of
government (as it has evolved in developed economies) and the
productivity and interests of private enterprise (again, in developed
economies) should be harmonized in a new and more effective form of
collaboration (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 8). This ostensible
appearance of an insubstantial flimsy premise does not specify or
define the content of the so-called ‘new’ and more effective form of
collaboration” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 8). The authors, however,
propose to “start a discussion of the key issues that should be
considered in developing these new forms of collaboration and to
reflect on the role that business in particular might play” (Ferenbach
& Pinney 2012: 8).
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Ferenbach and Pinney note that “[t]oday 44 of the largest
100 economies in the world are businesses with power and influence
exceeding that of many nation states” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 9).
They argue that with the emergence of much “flatter” global firms
with more power and influence than many nation states, the social
contract, “designed in the context of national economies and nation
states”, has been rendered ineffective (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 9).
In other words, the emergence of global firms as powerful global
economies demand the establishment of a new social contract for the
efficient, profitable, and sustainable functioning of global business.
The state, according to Ferenbach and Pinney, has not yet succeeded
in reinventing itself in consonance with the complexification unleashed
by globalization and, therefore, is not capable of effective decision
making, specifically, at global level. Businesses, on the other hand,
have been successfully adapting themselves with the changing form
of integration of markets. Business and the firm have been recreating
themselves by adopting a strategy of flexibility, rapid responsiveness,
and constant readiness compatible with unending change and
adaptability in terms of innovation, de-hierarchicalization, and ever-
increasing productivity “while at the same time often avoiding
responsibility for reductions in employment, loss of health benefits,
or reductions in retirement benefits” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 11).
The proposed social contract also seeks more reductions in regulation
of the business by government. Above all, the firm has emerged to be
much more flexible and adaptable whereas government has been
relatively rigid, more inadaptable and more inflexible. This disjuncture,
so to speak, between the government and the firm demands
modifications of the roles of both government and the firm, embedded
in the framework of a ‘new’ social contract.
Critical Appraisal of the ‘New’ Social Contract
There was “an implicit social contract binding labor,
management, and government” (Ferenbach & Pinney). Global
integration of markets has changed the bargaining potential of labor,
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management and government. A major tension between government
and the firm was that government was presumed to promote interests
of the labor whereas the firm’s management viewed labor as a cost.
Relationship between labor2 and management was supposed to be of
adversarial nature. However, in the era of globalization, with the greater
availability of labor force across the globe, the labor has steadily
been losing bargaining capability. For example, even at the major
center of capitalism, i.e., the U.S, “the decline of unions, which once
represented a third of American workers now represent about 12
percent” only (Stiglitz 2011). After the de-unionization of labor and
continuous “withering away” of the welfare state, there were virtually
two parties to the social contract, namely, the private sector and the
public sector or business and government.
Government and business are now, to be precise, virtually
tied with each other in a bi-directional causality, that is, both are
reciprocally reliant on each other for their mutual success. They are,
in effect, supplementary and complementary to each other. However,
their mutual relationship, in the absence of active participation of
labor, appears to be both cooperative and adversarial. The state and
business are actually interdependent. For neoliberals, business is
only partially dependent on the state, at least, for ensuring the
enforcement of contracts, maintaining law and order, and providing
protection from internal theft and looting as well as foreign invasion
whereas the state, in essence, is dependent on business, particularly,
for revenues, production of goods and services, and provision of full
employment for the citizens. Simultaneously, business and the state
are adversarial to each other in that the state’s responsibility for
promotion and protection of capital, in general, coupled with
enhancement of common good, in particular, often conflicts with
business’s professed primary pursuit of maximization of personal
interest.
2-It is once  only that Ferenbach and Pinney  (2012)  mention labor  also  as a
party to the social contract. They have always mentioned two parties to the
“new”  social contract, namely, corporation (business) and the government .
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW APRIL 2016
Research
225
An Appraisal of Ferenbach . . .
While Ferenbach and Pinney deny the rootedness of their
formulation of ‘new’ social contract in “an ideological or political
perspective” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 8), it appears to be deeply
ideological. It is ideological as well as political, for example, in
advocating the efficient market hypothesis and even explicitly
supporting more self-regulation for the private sector and de-
sovereignization of the state. Ferenbach and Pinney’s emphasis on
formulating a ‘new’ social contract inherently aims at a still greater
balance of power in favor of business: “society is now looking to
business for leadership in helping create the renewed social balance”
(Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 11). The proposed social contract, or a
new neoliberal agenda, demands shifting of the balance for regulation
in favor of business: “Business will also need to take more
responsibility for ‘self-regulating’ its impact on society and the
environment, and manage for the long-term interests of shareholders
and society” (Ferenbach and Pinney 2012: 13). Business seeks greater
self-regulation because government needs to reinvent itself to do its
job efficiently but hitherto half-hearted attempts, if any taken, at
reinventing government “suggest that significant progress on this
front will be difficult” (Ferenbach and Pinney 2012: 11). On the other
hand, Ferenbach and Pinney do not seem to realize that the tremendous
bailouts given by the governments to the financial industry exhibit
that the “misguided attempt to reduce the role of the state has resulted
in government taking on a larger role than anyone would have
anticipated even in the New Deal” (Stiglitz 2010: 185).
The proposed sketch of the ‘new’ social contract may be
deemed as a current neoliberal agenda: “The neoliberal formula is
guided by social and economic deregulation, attacking any restriction
of market mechanisms by the state and creating a situation of free
accumulation of private capital” (Jinkings 2011: 11). The prevailing
ascendency of neoliberal ideology has eventually resulted in de-
unionization of labor, prioritization of personal interest over common
good, and the replacement of social welfare state with “a corporate
welfare state, including the extension and strengthening of the
corporate safety net, even as social protections for ordinary
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individuals…being weakened” (Stiglitz 2010: 199). It is so partly
because the owners of a global firm “have access to governments,
and influence the policies being pursued by them, far more effectively
than can its nominal citizens” (Crouch 2012: 32). In addition to their
immense influence on the policy-making the owners of the global firm
and “the highly paid professionals whose skills are demanded across
the world…have considerable power but owe loyalty to no particular
human community” (Crouch 2012: 32-33). Though many businesses,
as asserted by Ferenbach and Pinney, in the contemporary world
have become more powerful and influential than many nation states,
it is also a fact that markets “have no inherent moral character” (Stiglitz
2012: xiii). Unlike the global firm, the nation-state is, in principle,
presumed to be primarily committed to the common good of a particular
human community. The state is supposed to restrain excessive
inequality, and provide social goods such as education, security,
health care, etc., to all citizens. But after the global integration of
markets the nation-state is increasingly showing incompetence to
achieve common good even at the national level without addressing
‘common’ good of all inhabitants of the globe because of the fact that
now “we live in a world of ‘overlapping communities of fate’” (Held
2008: x). If the state itself does not fairly provide common good to its
citizens it need not entail that business should do the job on behalf of
the state for business is wholly and solely grounded on the principle
of private interest. It more precisely entails that the state needs to be
reformed. Arguing with reference to the Great Recession, Habermas
observes that “the speculators too were acting consistently within
the established legal framework, according to the socially recognized
logic of profit maximization…Politics, and not capitalism, is responsible
for promoting the common good” (Habermas 2009: 184). For example,
Habermas (2008) proposes a postnational multilevel political model
for global governance consisting of national, transnational and
supranational levels. Habermas (2008), in his another treatise, argues
that the European Union should be taken more or less as a model for
developing regional regimes beyond national borders for promoting
a balance between common good and personal interest.
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In their discussion of key issues, Ferenbach and Pinney do
not even touch upon the problem of ever-increasing inequality both
at national and global levels. Ferenbach and Pinney appear to support
and advance the current neoliberal “rules of global trade [that] are
heavily structured to protect the interests of the well-off and are
heavily stacked against the interests of the poorest countries” (Held
2008: 57). Inequality both at national and global levels “leads to weak
demand; widening inequality weakens demand even more; and, in
most countries, including the U.S., the crisis has only worsened
inequality…to be sure, the neoliberal policies that have prevailed for
the past three decades have much to do with our current predicament”
(Stiglitz 2014). It should be noted here that before the collapse of the
U.S.S.R., the firm was actually competing with a more formidable
competitor than the national labor, namely, the socialist state which
was avowedly based on the manifesto that said: “Workers of the
World, Unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains” (Marx &
Engels 2010: 67). Arguing that inequality was one of the root causes
of the Great Recession 2008, Lysandrou (2011) notes that “the global
capitalist economic system has a huge potential for generating
inequality. In the recent decades it is this negative aspect of capitalism
which has come to the fore, and the grim irony is that it was the utter
failure and collapse of the communist experiment that has helped to
give this development momentum” (Lysandrou 2011: 341). The problem
of global inequality has become more severe, for example, with the
“global dispersion of costs3associated with the recent financial crisis”
(Held 2010: 192). In other words, the neoliberal agenda of minimalization
of the role of government and government’s acceptance of this agenda
has resulted in rising global inequality.
3 “ While before September 2008 only 6 countries had stand-by arrangements
and flexible credit lines  with the IMF, totaling less than $ 1.7 billion, by
September 2009 this had risen to 21 countries, drawing a total of over $ 165.7
billion (only one of these countries, Iceland, was a rich developed country).
Such dispersions of negative economic shocks affect extremely vulnerable
segments of the world population”  (Held 2010: 193).
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The formulation of the “new” social contract in terms of its
assertion contrasting inefficient and incapable government with the
flexible, adaptable and efficient firm more or less contextualizes this
proposed compact as “bogged down by [an] ideological presumption,
such as that markets are always efficient and government is always
inefficient” (Stiglitz 2010: 197). While celebrating firm’s flexibility and
adaptability Ferenbach and Pinney seem to be insensitive to the fact
that firm’s flexibility, or in other words, its “capacity to deconstruct
itself is the most extreme form taken by the firm in its dominance of
contemporary society” (Crouch 2012: 38). For example, “the archetypal
contemporary firm…makes use of a diversity of labor-service contract
forms in order to bring together fluctuating combinations of workers
and dispense with the need to have any actual employees” (Crouch
2012: 38).
In accordance with neoliberal ideology, Ferenbach and
Pinney do not in any way see the private sector’s failure__moral or
technical__ in causing the Great Recession but rather they see it
caused by the erosion of the existing social contract that does not
recognize the incapability and inflexibility of governments. Pointing
out the factors “at play in the recent global financial crisis,” Held
(2010) inter alia mentions “essential confidence in the efficient market
hypothesis [and] the powerful private authority of private sector
actors” (Held 2010: 188). “The 2007 crisis should be understood as an
elite debacle, driven by improvising bankers and allowed by permissive
regulators” (Engelen et al. 2012: 372). The proposed sketch of a ‘new’
social contract seems to be neither new nor devoid of ideology, since
it is more or less a re-articulation of the neoliberal ideology: “once
government is seen as essentially incompetent and firms as uniquely
competent, as neoliberal ideology implies, governments come under
pressure to give over to firms and corporate leaders ever more control
over public business” (Crouch 2012: 109). An irony related to
neoliberals is that “they blame all failure on the compromises of those
who realized their schemes (there was still too much state intervention
etc.), and demand nothing less than an even more radical
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implementation of their doctrines,” (Zizek 2009: 19) and assert
disembeddedness of their premises either in doctrines or ideology.
The suggested social contract is essentially rooted in the
neoliberal orthodoxy, also, in its celebration of divestitures, that is, its
emphasis on the transfer of assets from the public to the private sector,
and its assertion regarding the inefficiency of government in terms of
its cost ineffectiveness because of poor services as well as concern
for labor. Ferenbach and Pinney advocate divesting “nationalized
businesses as well as other services and responsibilities to the private
sector” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 9).  Disapproving the government’s
ownership and operation of “areas such as power generation,
telecommunications, transportation and public housing,” Ferenbach
and Pinney observe__disregarding the housing bubble 2008__ that
“while in government hands, such operations were constrained by
political considerations, both service and labor-related, that made them
both inefficient and high cost…In private hands, they became
successful participants in the economy” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012:
9). On the contrary, while it has been observed that “the capitalist
mode of production has recently been taken to excess (namely the
cases of privatized railways, water supply and air traffic control)”
(Crouch 2012: 105). Ferenbach and Pinney (2012) attempt to give
examples of inefficient public firms, and do not acknowledge that “there
are examples of efficient and inefficient firms in both the public and
the private sector” (Stiglitz 2010: 198). For instance, “the internet, on
which so much recent prosperity has been based, was created through
government funding…It was brought to market by Netscape” (Stiglitz
2010: 200). One of the two major challenges for the proposed social
contract, according to Ferenbach and Pinney, is “to find ways to use
private-sector capabilities to help governments deliver more effective
goods and services” (Ferenbach & Pinney: 8). In the late 1990s, while
the German government sought to use “private-sector capabilities”
by engaging “employees of leading private firms to devise its corporate
tax policies; not surprisingly, the result was a major shift in the German
tax burden away from large corporations towards small firms and
workers” (Crouch 2012: 46). In the U.S., “on average, contactors
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charged the federal government more than twice the amount it pays
federal workers for performing comparable services…it was not just
ideology that drove the contracting/privatization agenda: it was rent
seeking” (Stiglitz 2012: 176).
The Old Wine of Strategic CSR in New Bottles of CSV and the
Social Purpose
Tension between the role of government and business is
essentially caused by the fact of their rootedness in two divergent
principles that conflict with each other. Government is mainly based
on the principle of common good whereas business is definitively
based on the principle of private good. Enhancement of one interest
ipso facto curtails the other one. For example, government’s backing
of the bargaining rights of the labor is in accordance with the common
good whereas firm’s opposition of the same rights is grounded on
pursuit of personal interest.
The discourse and practice of CSR are attempt, of course, to
a very limited extent, to bridge the gap between the personal interest
and the common good. Ferenbach and Pinney, with reference to some
organizations4, they mostly work for, try to make a case for integrating
“the social purpose and roles of corporations and markets” with
business (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 11). They are also interested in
adding a “human dimension” to business rooted in Porter and
Kramer’s (2011) view of Creating Shared Value (CSV). The social role
that they wish to integrate with business is by no means a post-crisis
phenomenon. For example, The Environmental Defense Fund’s
targeted “win-win” situation that “reduces both operating costs and
emissions of greenhouse gases,” (Ferenbach & Pinney 2012: 12) is
not something new. To take only one example, 3E introduced its PPP
4For example, the Centre for Enterprise, Markets and Ethics, the Apsen
Institute, The Environmental Defense Fund, and The Alliance for
Business Leadership.
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(Pollution Prevention Pays) program about four decades ago. Such
practices are usually performed as CSR, mainly strategic CSR.
Regarding CSV, Crane et al. (2014) skillfully observe that it does not
even acknowledge the tension between personal interest and common
good: “the failure to acknowledge, let alone address, social and
economic tensions is not unique to CSV. Much of the CSR and
stakeholder management literature has done likewise, particularly the
strategic CSR literature that Porter and Kramer has reproduced as
CSV” (Crane et al. 2014: 137).  This hollow emphasis on a human
dimension, which in effect is not human enough, will not restrain the
main actors of the firm from pursuing “their self-interest [even] in
ways that draw criticism, like aggressive tax avoidance and lobbying
for less regulation” (Crane et al. 2014: 137).
As noted above it is more or less this agenda of less regulation and
more empowerment of the private sector that the ‘new’ social contract
advocates by stressing incapability and inflexibility of the public
sector. It should also be noted that the main actors of the firm create a
unique “balance” of knowledge and responsibility. In the times of
recessions and crises many of them shift balance to giving ignorance
pretexts whereas in the times of recovery and prosperity they make
capability and knowledge claims. For example, after the happening of
the Great Recession the central actors “were always able to claim just
enough knowledge to retain power within the system, but just enough
ignorance to evade responsibility” (Davies & McGoey 2012: 73). The
formulation of the ‘new’ social contract insisting on more shifting of
power balance in favor of the private sector is rooted in such “balance”
between capability (knowledge) and responsibility as noted above;
and the integration of strategic human dimension with business,
ostensibly aiming to provide moral legitimacy to the ascendancy of
neoliberal socio-economic perspective.
Conclusion
It is my opinion that the proposed sketch of ‘new’ social contract is
simply continuation of neoliberal ideology, for example, it is evident
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from its advocacy of (a) the transfer of ownership of assets from the
public to the private sector, (b) greater dependence of the public
sector on the private sector, and (c) less government regulation of
the private sector. Consequently, the implicit balance of authority
between the public and the private sectors is skewed toward efficient
market hypothesis. Moreover, Ferenbach and Pinney do not appear
to acknowledge in any way the failures of private sector in causing
the Great Recession but rather their position suggests that the
recession was caused by the existing social contract which, in their
opinion, legitimizes larger involvement of the public sector in business.
This line of thought is nothing new but continuation of neoliberal
ideology dominating world business scenario for some two decades.
Thus, the proposed sketch of the ‘new’ social contract does not seem
to be either an appropriate response to or a proper strategy for the
global integration of markets or a scrupulous exposition of the root
cause of the Great Recession.
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